In January 2011, I was cited for a violation of Califiornia Vehicle Code section 27315 because I had two passengers in my car who were sharing one seat belt.  Although I have been an attorney for 23 years, I was unaware of any code section or case that made it illegal to allow two people to share one seat belt.  I embarked upon an extensive research project to determine whether or not the cop was right. 

California Vehicle Code section 27315, subdivision (d) states, in pertinent part:
(1) A person shall not operate a motor vehicle on a highway unless that person and all passengers 16 years of age or over are properly restrained by a safety belt…

I could find nowhere in the vast body of legal research available to me any authority for the proposition that "properly restrained" excludes the use of double belting.  However, I did find the Federal Safety Guidelines, deep in the reservoirs of legal research, wherein the Federal Government states that each person should have their own seat belt.  But because it was so diffcult for me, even as a seasoned, experienced attorney, to find that information, I took the position that it's not fair to make double-belting illegal without giving us citizens fair warning of what "properly restrained" means.  I wrote the following brief for the Placer County Superior Court.  Although my legal reasoning was sound, the court found that "everyone knows that double-belting is unsafe," and I was fined $10.  Although my arguments were rejected by the Placer County Superior Court, my case did not result in a published decision and I continue to believe that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 

“’It is a basic principle of due process’ that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions [and requirements] are not clearly defined.” (Mason v. Office of Admin. Hearings (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126.) Under the federal Constitution (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) and the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7), substantive due process of law in the context of vagueness requires two elements: a statute must be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard or guide against which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts. (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 141; People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887, 897.)

“[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) “ ‘ “The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ [Citation.] The requirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social values, reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 339.) “ A statute must be definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed as well as a standard for the ascertainment of guilt by the courts called upon to apply it. [Citations.]’ ”  See In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373-1374.

“The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).  See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 –232 (1951); Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 531, 539-543; Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77.  Defendant submits that California Vehicle Code section 27315, subdivision (d) is void for vagueness, as applied in this case.

California Vehicle Code section 27315, subdivision (d) states, in pertinent part:
(1) A person shall not operate a motor vehicle on a highway unless that person and all passengers 16 years of age or over are properly restrained by a safety belt…

The language of section 27315 does not provide persons of ordinary intelligence with fair notice that the term “properly restrained” does not include two people sharing the same seatbelt.  Furthermore, there is no California case law that interprets Vehicle Code section 27315, subdivision (d) to prohibit more than one person from using the same seatbelt at the same time. 
“In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs. [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) “[I]n construing this, or any statute, we may not broaden or narrow the scope of the provision by reading into it language that does not appear in it or reading out of it language that does. ‘Our office... “is simply to ascertain and declare” what is in the relevant statutes, “not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.”’ [Citation.] “‘“[A] court... may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language.’” [Citation.]” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545.)  See People v. Leiva (March 1, 2011)  B214397.

In the case at bar, if the California Legislature intended to mean that only one person can legally be in one seatbelt at a time, it knows how to use language clearly expressing that intent and it should have done so.
Other jurisdictions have worded their seatbelt statutes so as to specifically prohibit more than one person from wearing a seatbelt at the same time.  For example, The Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER H.8, provides in pertinent part as follows:
106.
How to wear seat belt assembly
(5) A seat belt assembly shall be worn so that,
(d) no more than one person is wearing the seat belt assembly at any one time. 2006, c. 25, s. 1.
(See http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90h08_e.htm#BK174)
In Canada, new legislation was recently introduced in order to “prevent people from getting into a vehicle that doesn't have enough seatbelts.”  The new legislation requires one seatbelt for every passenger in a vehicle.  (See http://www.buckleupsc.com/seat_belt_law.asp.) 

Because seatbelt legislation in the United States varies from state to state, the South Carolina legislature has made it clear in their seatbelt statute that the provisions of their seatbelt law do not apply to “an occupant for which no safety belt is available because all belts are being used by other occupants.”  (See Section 56-5-6520 and Section 56-5-6530.)   Because the California seatbelt law does not have a similar provision exempting occupants from wearing a seatbelt when one is not available because all belts are being used by other occupants, persons of ordinary intelligence can reasonably conclude that in order to be in compliance with California law, such additional occupants should share existing seatbelts.

Because California Vehicle Code section 27315, subdivision (d) does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that having two people share one seat belt is forbidden by the statute, it would be unconstitutional to hold defendant criminally responsible for conduct which she could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.  United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).